Security for the systems you build around a model. The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications — prompt injection, improper output handling, system prompt leakage, excessive agency — plus attacks on the models themselves, MLSecOps practice, and the governance layer of NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 42001 and the EU AI Act. Remembered with spaced repetition.
AI security covers the whole system you build around a model, not the model alone. There are four distinct layers, and treating them as one topic is why teams miss things: the application that puts untrusted text into a prompt and then acts on what comes back; the model itself, which can be poisoned, evaded, inverted or copied; the pipeline that trains, packages and serves it; and the governance that has to answer for all of it.
The single most misread item is prompt injection. It is not a prompting problem with a prompting fix — instructions and data reach the model through the same channel, so the model has no way to tell a developer's rule from a line hidden in a retrieved document. That is architectural, which is why the guidance is layered controls rather than a better filter, and why the interesting questions are about privilege and output handling: what the model is allowed to call, and what happens to its answer when it reaches a browser, a shell or a query.
This track works through the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications at the threat level, the classic attacks on models — poisoning, evasion, inversion, membership inference, extraction — the MLSecOps controls that answer them (model and dataset provenance, AI-BOM, artifact scanning), the risks AI assistants bring into your own SDLC such as slopsquatting and context leakage, and the frameworks a regulator or auditor will ask about. It is a security companion to the AI tracks, not a replacement for them.
Each module is a set of flashcards — 75 in total. Answer, review, and watch your knowledge grow from seed to full bloom.
Attacks against the LLM application itself — prompt injection and its channels, improper output handling, system prompt leakage and agent privilege
15 cardsAttacks against ML models themselves — poisoning, evasion, inversion, membership inference and model extraction
15 cardsTreating models and datasets as supply-chain artifacts — provenance, AI-BOM, artifact scanning and inference-path protection
15 cardsRisks introduced by using AI assistants and agents to build software — generated code, hallucinated dependencies and context leakage
15 cardsThe frameworks and law shaping AI risk work — OWASP LLM Top 10, NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 42001 and the EU AI Act
15 cardsA taste of the real flashcards. Pick an answer, then reveal the explanation.
What distinguishes an indirect prompt injection from a direct one?
Where does the real risk lie when an application's system prompt leaks?
What does a training-data poisoning attack do?
What does an AI-BOM inventory beyond a conventional software bill of materials?
What is slopsquatting?
On what basis does the EU AI Act impose obligations?
Each card is one practical concept with multiple options. Pick what you think is right.
See the correct option plus a clear explanation, and a link to deeper docs when one is available.
A spaced-repetition engine (SM-2 or FSRS) resurfaces each card just before you would forget it.
A model turns text into actions, which is a class of vulnerability no traditional review is looking for — and every team shipping an LLM feature now owns it.
Direct versus indirect, the retrieval channel, multimodal payloads, and why input filtering alone cannot close it.
Cards link to OWASP GenAI, NIST, ISO and the EU AI Act text itself, rather than to secondary summaries that go stale.
NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 42001 and the EU AI Act risk tiers — enough to know which obligations attach to what you are building.
It is a catalogue of the risks specific to applications built on large language models — prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, supply chain, data and model poisoning, improper output handling, excessive agency, system prompt leakage, vector and embedding weaknesses, misinformation and unbounded consumption. It is versioned, so check genai.owasp.org for the current edition rather than an older blog summary.
Prompt injection is input that makes a model follow the attacker's instructions instead of the application's. There is no known complete fix, because instructions and data share one channel — so the practical answer is layered: constrain what the model can do, validate its output before anything acts on it, give it the narrowest privileges, and require human approval for high-impact actions.
Direct injection is a user typing the malicious instructions themselves. Indirect injection hides them in content the model later reads — a web page, a file, a retrieved document — so the attacker never touches the conversation. Indirect is the one that matters most for RAG systems and agents, because the attack surface becomes everything the model is allowed to fetch.
MLSecOps extends DevSecOps practice to models and datasets, treating them as supply-chain artifacts: recording model and dataset provenance, inventorying them in an AI-BOM, scanning serialized model files before loading them, signing and versioning what gets deployed, and monitoring the inference path in production.
It can. The Act attaches obligations to the risk tier of a system's intended use, and its scope reaches providers outside the EU when a system is placed on the EU market or its output is used in the EU. The cards cover the mechanisms rather than dates or penalties — verify anything you rely on against the official text, and take legal advice for your own case.
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Plant your first seed today. Ten minutes a day turns prompt injection, MLSecOps and the EU AI Act into knowledge you can act on.